29 de mayo de 2011

CAMBALACHE FRENTISTA Por Alfredo García

CORTANDO GRUESO: ‎ 12/05/2011  Semanario Voces

http://www.voces.com.uy/articulos-1/cortandogruesocambalachefrentistaporalfredogarcia

Saturados, aburridos, decepcionados, indiferentes, así se encuentran un montón de ciudadanos por la sucesión de hechos que protagonizan el Frente y el gobierno. Otros, estamos preocupados, alarmados, nerviosos y muy calientes por el manejo que hacen de la política y de la fuerza política cuatro gatos locos. No es de izquierda callarse frente a la injusticia y menos aun callarse frente a aquellos que hipotecan el futuro del proyecto frentista. Así que acá van varias cosas que teníamos miedo de decir.

“problemático y febril...”

El Frente Amplio está muerto. El movimiento político concebido en 1971 que agrupaba por vez primera a un vasto espectro de la sociedad uruguaya bajo la forma de coalición y movimiento, ha dejado de existir.

Nació como resultado de varios vectores: de las luchas obreras y estudiantiles, de la radicalización de la clase media y los intelectuales, del desgaste de los partidos tradicionales,de la opción por los más humildes de la teología de la liberación, de la crisis económica y de la revolución cubana. Del colapso del modelo batllista, del Mayo francés, de la militancia de los comunistas, del movimiento hippie y las acciones de los tupas. Creció con una efervescencia incontenible, proliferó en incontables comités de base rebosantes de gente, discutió, polemizó y revolucionó la vida política uruguaya. Éramos tantos militantes como votantes y alcanzamos un techo, pero llegamos para cambiar la vida y ni la dictadura lo pudo exterminar. Renació con la liberación de Seregni y comenzó a transitar un largo sendero de veinte años hasta alcanzar el gobierno y se transformó en un inmenso movimiento de masas. Con altibajos y conflictos internos se convirtió en la mayor organización política de nuestro país. Y en este proceso tuvo que pagar costos.

“se ha mezclao la vida”

El Frente Amplio es una coalición de burócratas. Mal que nos pese se liquidó la ecuación: coalición y movimiento. Aquellas estructuras de base y dirección repletas de gente no existen más. Los pocos comités existentes sufren de insuficiencia militante y solo reverdecen un poquito en vísperas de congresos y elecciones. En el primer caso para obtener puestos de delegados, tan caros a las organizaciones que carecen del respaldo de los votos y así poder incidir en la interna frenteamplista. Con nombre y apellido: Partido Comunista. Y en el segundo, como mano de obra barata para repartir listas y hacer propaganda, aunque cada vez más los sectores se lanzan por la propia y hasta contratan gente para que haga las tareas. Los comités dejaron de ser esos semilleros de ideas, de actividades y de inserción barrial de antaño, hay que asumirlo. ¿Qué pasa en las estructuras centrales? De las comisiones mas vale ni hablar por la inoperancia que han demostrado. La casa central del Frente se ha vuelto un bastión de funcionarios rentados o delegados sectoriales que no largan la silla ni aunque vengan degollando. En la mesa política y en el plenario tienen delegados algunas organizaciones que son casi empresas unipersonales, porque siendo francos, ¿cuánta gente agrupan grupúsculos como la Corriente de Izquierda (CI), el POR (Partido Obrero Revolucionario), el FIDEL (Frente Izquierda de Liberación), el PVP (Partido por la Victoria del Pueblo), el PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores) el Movimiento 20 de Mayo, la CUF, el Movimiento Socialista o Compromiso Frenteamplista? Y para qué vamos a hablar de los delegados de las bases. Me atrevo a decir que en un 90% pertenecen a organizaciones políticas a las que rinden obediencia y representan sus posturas más que las de la masa frenteamplista que tanto invocan.

“los ignorantes nos han igualao”

El Frente Amplio esta manejado por mediocres.
Hay que asumirlo, se acabó el tiempo de aquellos dirigentes con un nivel político impresionante. Se fueron los Rodney Arismendi, los Juan Pablo Terra, los Héctor Rodriguez, los José Pedro Cardozo, los Carlos Quijano, los Hugo Cores, los Zelmar Michelini, los Raul Sendic o los Liber Seregni. Y con ellos no solo perdimos estatura ideológica, también se fueron un montón de valores. Hoy, la permanencia o la obsecuencia son una garantía para llegar a dirigente. Así estamos plagados de un sin fin de oportunistas, de todos pelos y señales, que se acercaron al calorcito del poder y se aferran a él. Están los que cambian de grupo como de camiseta, los que hoy dicen A y mañana B, porque consiguen algo a cambio. Son la nueva “nomenklatura”, que sirven para un barrido como para un fregado. Hoy soy edil, mañana director de un ente, pasado alcalde y luego diputado. Por supuesto que la carrera de dirigente sindical también es una buena forma de llegar a algún carguito. La formación política es la gran ausente, total para qué, si la lucha ideológica dejó paso a la lucha por los puestos. En esta “chauchez” surge entonces una nueva categoría de gúrues de la esfera política. Los politólogos. Se vuelven la referencia ineludible para cualquier análisis, noticia, estudio o mensaje. Poseen una enorme capacidad de adaptar la realidad a las teorías por ellos estudiadas y a predecir el futuro, manteniendo una perfecta equidistancia con las posturas partidarias. Menos mal. Porque cuando les da por saltar la frontera entre la academia y la política es un papelón. Parafraseando el refrán: “lo que natura no da, Salamanca no presta”, lanzamos la versión uruguaya: “lo que la experiencia política no te dio, no lo conseguís en la UDELAR”.

“maquiavelos y estafaos”

El Frente Amplio sufre una guerra de aparatos.
Las luchas intestinas no son una novedad en la izquierda y nunca fueron de guante blanco. Había proyectos diversos y se planteaban vías diferentes. Se polemizaba duro y parejo, y muchas veces no solo con palabras. Cómo olvidar los debates sindicales sobre lucha de conjunto o golpeteo y desgaste en la década del setenta. Cómo no recordar el dilema foco o partido. Cómo no traer a la memoria la discusión sobre los comunicados 4 y 7 de las Fuerzas Armadas y la disputa sobre si la dictadura era fascista o no. Es imposible olvidar la polémica por el voto en blanco del 82, el pacto del Club Naval en el 84 y la reforma Constitucional del 96 en el seno de la izquierda. Pero la escala de valores y las metas eran las mismas. Y las organizaciones políticas agrupaban cuadros y masas, movían gente y eran una cantera inagotable de ideas y propuestas. Se generaba acumulación hacia un proyecto de cambio, que sin estar muy definido, se presentía inexorable. Varios muros se nos cayeron encima y la militancia de otrora pasó en gran medida a cuarteles de invierno. Hoy la gran mayoría de la izquierda no esta encuadrada en organización alguna y sin dejar de ser izquierda se mantiene independiente. Eso lleva a que los sectores políticos queden reducidos a su mínima expresión, pero un aparatito organizado influye más que miles de personas. Así se mueven hoy los sectores políticos en la interna frentista, ocupando posiciones y disputando espacios entre ellos. Lo peor del caso es que dentro de los propios grupos hay a su vez otros aparatos que muchas veces se embarcan en luchas fratricidas. No hace falta más que mirar al interior del MPP, el partido Socialista, la Vertiente, el partido Comunista o Asamblea Uruguay para distinguir fracciones y tendencias en lucha encarnizada. Todos ellos mantienen aun en forma inconciente la concepción leninista de la organización, aunque renieguen de Lenin o lo desconozcan. Unidad de acción, centralismo democrático, disciplina partidaria, verticalismo, son solo algunos de los conceptos aplicados y ellos tiñen el funcionamiento de todo el Frente Amplio. Es así que se definen programas, líneas de acción y candidaturas, la mayor de las veces a espaldas de la gente. Porque la gente común no está para entrar en la picadora de carne de la militancia sectorial y los deja hacer a estos iluminados que la tienen clara. A veces a alguno se le va la mano con el aparatismo y los otros protestan, pero ninguno se anima a patear el tablero porque todos juegan al mismo juego, y tienen alternadamente el control y la posibilidad de ganar.

“¡qué atropello a la razón!”


El Frente Amplio es antidemocrático.
Estamos viviendo hoy una situación caótica, donde se va para atrás y para adelante, mezclando cuestiones políticas con posturas éticas. Donde cualquier voz disidente es catalogada de traidora y enseguida salen un montón de Robespierres criollos queriendo cortar cabezas. Donde para muchos (en realidad una pequeña minoría) el tema impunidad es su razón de ser, de existir, y no transan con nada ni nadie. Fundamentalistas de los derechos humanos, tomando como tales solo algunos, no reparan en los riesgos que ponen al proyecto de cambio de la izquierda. Y no estoy hablando de elecciones, sino de las profundas transformaciones que comenzamos y que pueden trancarse si despreciamos olímpicamente el mecanismo de la democracia directa. Si en el futuro gobiernan otros, ¿con qué cara podremos salir a pedir firmas, para que el pueblo decida? La miopía política es mala consejera y el afán revanchista es un pésimo aliado. El tema es demasiado importante y demasiado sensible para una enorme mayoría de la población como para resolverlo a lo Pirro, por la circunstancial mayoría parlamentaria. Acá se precisa volver al viejo espíritu seregnista y reivindicamos el consenso como salida para este tema. Un consenso nacional porque la mayoría de los uruguayos rechazan la impunidad, pero también quieren mirar hacia delante, dejando atrás una parte negra de nuestra historia.

“revolcaos en un merengue”


Los líderes del Frente Amplio metieron la pata.
Dejarse llevar por la costumbre no es una buena práctica en la vida política y más si lo que se pretende es la transformación en serio de nuestra sociedad. Estamos hablando de la aceptación de la política del hecho consumado en lo que a impulsar plebiscitos se refiere. ¿Recuerdan el plebiscito de Ancap? Había un proyecto redactado -entre otros- por dirigentes frentistas de primer nivel y ante la iniciativa del sindicato de impulsar una consulta popular, Tabaré dejó colgados a esos compañeros y se subió en forma oportunista al planteo. Luego sufrió en carne propia los efectos del plebiscito del agua que tuvo que aplicar siendo presidente. En el caso del plebiscito contra la impunidad de la papeleta rosada, la macaneó el Pepe, porque aun sin estar de acuerdo con la oportunidad del mismo, cedió a presiones y firmó. Yo no me olvido de las fotos del entonces senador Mujica cargando las cajas con las firmas en el Palacio Legislativo, mostrando tácitamente su apoyo con esa actitud. Un dirigente no cede a presiones por mezquinos cálculos electorales, cuando considera que algo es inconveniente. Pero la cosa se complica más todavía, porque aun no está claro el papel del presidente en la participación del canciller en la elaboración de la ley interpretativa, al que luego desautoriza públicamente. Y en la votación en el Senado, ¿era tan difícil convencer a Fernandez Huidobro para que votara en contra antes de renunciar? Porque de esa manera se hubiera evitado todo este enredo. O -por otro lado- quién entiende a Danilo Astori que vota a favor de la ley y luego declara en una entrevista que no está de acuerdo con el proyecto. ¿Tuvo temor de los costos políticos que hubiera tenido su voto negativo? De las volteretas que practica Vázquez en torno al tema, no vale la pena ni hablar, el hombre -pensando en su carrera presidencial del 2014- quiere asegurarse de caer parado. Lo que queda claro es que ninguno de los dirigentes de nuestra fuerza política, tuvo las agallas o la visión de lo que se venía para enfrentar este tema y como dice el tango quedaron: “en el mismo lodo, todos manoseados”.

“Dale nomás, dale que va…”


El Frente Amplio debe ser refundado.
No se banca más esta situación. Los estridentes reclamos de los recién llegados, modernos adalides de la justicia que dictan cátedra de ética y coherencia, dan pena.

No se aguanta más este escenario. Donde los subidos al carro del frenteamplismo y a los votos de otros, intentan marcar la línea correcta, que ellos dicen poseer.

No se soporta más esta comedia. Donde los aparatchiks de turno se aferran a estatutos y porcentajes para no perder el control de la mayor organización de la izquierda uruguaya. Siendo como son un insignificante cinco por ciento.

No se tolera más esta payasada. Donde todos miden los costos políticos de sus sectores y los beneficios que pueden sacar de la coyuntura. Cobrando antiguas deudas y haciendo pagar a los otros por los errores colectivos.

No se resiste más este manejo inescrupuloso. El tema de la impunidad es demasiado sensible para la izquierda uruguaya y nadie puede apropiárselo. A todos nos duele por igual y todos tenemos nuestros compañeros caídos.

Pero no es el único tema y quizás ni sea el más importante. Entonces, no se trata de dividir aguas firmando proclamas o haciendo gárgaras de principismo. Es hora de que los frentistas en masa, los de a pie, los que no aspiramos honores o cargos, los independientes de siempre, los “fasecas”, alcemos nuestras voces, porque lo que esta en juego es el proyecto de todos. Las organizaciones son un medio no un fin, aunque alguno parece haberlo olvidado. Y si es necesario tendremos que sacudir y en serio las raíces de nuestro árbol interno. Porque si en la filosofía tanguera, “el mundo siempre fue una porquería”, nosotros los frentistas no estamos dispuestos a que lo siga siendo. Y más que nunca queremos liquidar el cambalache.

Alfredo García es periodista, tiene 55 años y es director del semanario “Voces” en Uruguay.
Es el autor de “Pepe Coloquios” un libro de entrevistas con frases polémicas de Pepe Mujica.


Alfredo García

Nací en Montevideo hace más de medio siglo. Soy padre de tres hijos y abuelo de Emma desde hace casi un año.
Estudié Derecho hasta el 73 y luego me radiqué en Estocolmo, Suecia, donde obtuve la Licenciatura en Historia en la universidad de la capital sueca.
Al regresar al Uruguay comencé a ejercer el periodismo en diversos medios hasta que en el 2004 lanzamos el semanario Voces del cual soy redactor responsable.
garcia

Género
Periodístico

Obra

 ”Voces”  junto a  Jorge Lauro.
Editorial: Fin de siglo
Año y lugar de edición: 2006, Montevideo
Depósito legal:  …………………
ISBN: 9974-49-374-9
PEPE COLOQUIOS
Editorial :Fin de Siglo
Año y lugar de edición: 2009, Montevideo
Depósito legal:  …………………
ISBN:978-9974-49-459-6 

Datos de Contacto

  • Web:
  • Email: voces@adinet.com.uy
  • Fecha de Nacimiento: 09-08-1954
  • Pais: Uruguay
  • Ciudad: Montevideo
  • Localidad: Parque Rodo

Registro Nacional

Esta es una ficha perteneciente al Registro Nacional de Escritores y Escritoras.

27 de mayo de 2011

Paying with Life and Limb for the Crimes of Nazi Germany


A Time of Retribution

Paying with Life and Limb for the Crimes of Nazi Germany

A Time of Retribution: Paying with Life and Limb for the Crimes of Nazi Germany
After Hitler's war had been lost, millions of ethnic Germans in regions that are today part of Eastern Europe were expelled -- often under horrendous circumstances. It has been proven that at least 473,000 people died as they fled or were expelled. The Nazis' crimes had been far worse, but the suffering of ethnic Germans was immense. By Christian Habbemore... Forum ]

25 de mayo de 2011

la mision historica de los blancos es recuperar la autonomia

En 1904 peleamos por la autonomía Perdimos y el poder político y económico se concentro en el puerto y la rosca colorada. Hay que recuperar la autonomía, reformar la constitución y que la mitad de los impuestos vayan directamente a los departamentos y que estos controlen su policía educación y obras publicas, como España Suiza Alemania Estados Unidos y Uruguay antes de 1904. Esa es la misión histórica de los blancos

24 de mayo de 2011

Raul Sendic junior nepotismo corrupcion y mediocridad en Ancap

Macaneo sin fisuras PABLO DA SILVEIRA

La izquierda uruguaya se viene hundiendo en el ejercicio de un macaneo sin fisuras. Si en algún tiempo creyó ser un modelo de inteligencia y de rigor, hoy parece haberlo olvidado.

La discusión sobre la anulación de la Ley de Caducidad puso en evidencia una pérdida de pudor argumental pocas veces vista. Tal vez eso era inevitable, ya que no había manera elegante y rigurosa de justificar el desconocimiento de dos consultas populares. Pero lo peor es que la dirigencia frentista parece haberse habituado a ignorar la lógica y la verdad histórica. El último ejemplo lo dio el presidente de Ancap, Raúl Sendic, en una entrevista concedida a este diario.

Al ser consultado sobre su ideología, Sendic se definió como marxista y guevarista. Y al desarrollar este último punto mencionó "esa etapa tan fructífera que tuvo el Che de ministro de industria, de administrador, de líder en el ejemplo de la transformación de la sociedad. Muchas veces es más conocido por su etapa guerrillera, pero fue un gran administrador público, un hombre de gobierno, e hizo cosas importantísimas".

No es raro escuchar falsedades sobre el "Che" Guevara. Por ejemplo, que tenía un buen corazón (fue el comandante revolucionario que ejecutó a un mayor número de sus propios hombres) o que fue un gran estratega militar (no logró ninguna victoria importante). Casi todo lo que se dice de él es un mito. Todo eso es sabido y puede explicarse en función de intereses políticos y casualidades históricas. Un par de fotos formidables (una vivo y otra muerto) golpearon de lleno en una sensibilidad influida por siglos de iconografía cristiana y ayudaron a fabricar una imagen redentora. Pero, aun en este contexto de mitificación, es muy raro que alguien diga que Guevara fue un buen gobernante. Tanto amigos como enemigos admiten que fue un desastre.

Tras el triunfo de la revolución, Guevara ejerció una serie de cargos (presidente del Instituto de Reforma Agraria y del Banco Nacional en 1959, ministro de economía en 1960 y de industria en 1961) para los que no tenía formación ni experiencia. Las políticas que impul- só (una ideologizada reforma agraria, un ingenuo intento de diversificación de cultivos) fueron calamitosas. Entre 1961 y 1963, la cosecha de azúcar cayó de 6,8 a 3,8 millones. En 1962 hubo que congelar precios e introducir el racionamiento. Un intento de industrialización con tecnología checa fue abandonado.

Mientras sumaba fracasos, el Che fijaba objetivos delirantes. En 1961 anunció que la economía cubana alcanzaría en dos décadas a la estadounidense. Y como se negaba a usar incentivos económicos por considerarlos impropios del "hombre nuevo", utilizaba métodos cada vez más represivos que incluían la internación en campos de trabajo como castigo a la baja productividad. En 1965, Fidel Castro escuchó a sus asesores soviéticos y dejó a Guevara sin cargos. Esa es una de las razones que explica su retorno al combate.

La descripción que hace Sendic contradice todos los hechos conocidos, excepto uno: el Che vivió más tiempo como funcionario que como guerrillero.>
http://www.elpais.com.uy/110524/predit-568499/pablodasilveira/macaneo-sin-fisuras/

http://www.elpais.com.uy/110522/pnacio-568109/sociedad/-en-como-hay-que-transformar-la-sociedad-soy-marxista-y-guevarista-/


Perfil

Edad: 49 años . Licenciado en Genética de la Universidad de La Habana.,presidente de Ancap por el unico merito de ser el nene del lider tupamaro  Raul Sendic Antonaccio ( senior,) un clarisimo caso de nepotismo frenteamplista

El nepotismo es la preferencia que tienen algunos gobernantes o funcionarios públicos para dar empleos públicos a familiares sin tomar en cuenta la competencia de los mismos para la labor, sino su lealtad o alianza. Según Manuel Ossorio: "Desmedida preferencia que algunos dan a sus parientes para las gracias o empleos públicos".1 En países donde se practica la meritocracia (en su concepción de darwinismo social) su uso es generalmente negativo y el nepotismo se considera corrupción.

23 de mayo de 2011

Integrity: Without It Nothing Works


Integrity: Without It Nothing Works

"An individual is whole and complete when their word is whole and complete, and their word is whole and complete when they honour their word," says HBS professor Michael C. Jensen in this interview that appeared in Rotman: The Magazine of the Rotman School of Management, Fall 2009. Jensen (and his coauthors, Werner Erhard and Steve Zaffron) define and discuss integrity ("a state or condition of being whole, complete, unbroken, unimpaired, sound, in perfect condition"); the workability that integrity creates for individuals, groups, organizations, and society; and its translation into organizational performance. He also discusses the costs of lacking integrity and the fallacy of using a cost/benefit analysis when deciding whether to honor your word.

Executive Summary:

"An individual is whole and complete when their word is whole and complete, and their word is whole and complete when they honour their word," says HBS professor Michael C. Jensen in this interview that appeared in Rotman: The Magazine of the Rotman School of Management, Fall 2009. Jensen (and his coauthors, Werner Erhard and Steve Zaffron) define and discuss integrity ("a state or condition of being whole, complete, unbroken, unimpaired, sound, in perfect condition"); the workability that integrity creates for individuals, groups, organizations, and society; and its translation into organizational performance. He also discusses the costs of lacking integrity and the fallacy of using a cost/benefit analysis when deciding whether to honor your word. Key concepts include:
  • The personal and organizational benefits of honoring one's word are huge—both for individuals and for organizations—and generally unappreciated.
  • We can honor our word in one of two ways: by keeping it on time and as promised, or if that becomes impossible, by owning up to the parties counting on us to keep our word in advance and cleaning up the mess our failure to keep our word creates in their lives.
  • By failing to honor our word to ourselves, we undermine ourselves as persons of integrity, and create "unworkability" in our lives.
  • Integrity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for maximum performance.
  • There are unrecognized but significant costs to associating with people and organizations that lack integrity.

Abstract

There is confusion between integrity, morality and ethics. In our much longer paper on the topic—see "Integrity: A Positive Model that Incorporates the Normative Phenomena of Morality, Ethics and Legality" (available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=920625)—my co-authors and I distinguish integrity from morality and ethics in the following way. Integrity in our model is honoring your word. As such integrity is a purely positive phenomenon. It has nothing to do with good vs. bad, right vs. wrong behavior. Like the law of gravity the law of integrity just is, and if you violate the law of integrity as we define it you get hurt just as if you try to violate the law of gravity with no safety device. The personal and organizational benefits of honoring one's word are huge—both for individuals and for organizations—and generally unappreciated. 6 pages.

Paper Information


About Faculty in this Article:

HBS Faculty Member Michael C. Jensen
Michael C. Jensen is the Jesse Isidor Straus Professor of Business Administration, Emeritus, at Harvard Business School.

20 de mayo de 2011

A Look at the Root Causes of the Arab Revolution


Rising Literacy and a Shrinking Birth Rate

A Look at the Root Causes of the Arab Revolution

Photo Gallery
Photos
In a SPIEGEL interview, French social scientist Emmanuel Todd discusses the demographic roots of the Arab revolution, which he argues was spurred by rising literacy and rapidly shrinking birth rates. He also muses on the ghost of Osama bin Laden, arguing "al-Qaida was already dead," and on why he believes Germany is not a part of the "core West."

SPIEGEL: Monsieur Todd, in the middle of the Cold War, in the days of Leonid Brezhnev, you predicted the collapse of the Soviet system. In 2002, you described the economic and imperial erosion of the United States, a global superpower. And, four years ago, you and your colleague Youssef Courbage predicted the unavoidable revolution in the Arab world. Are you clairvoyant?

Todd: The academic as fortune-teller -- a tempting idea. But Courbage and I merely analyzed the reasons for a possible -- or let's say likely -- revolution in the Arab world, an inexorable change, which could also have unfolded as a gradual evolution. Our work was like that of geologists who compile the signs of an imminent earthquake or volcanic eruption. But when exactly the eruption takes place, and its form and severity -- these things cannot be predicted in an exact way.

SPIEGEL: On what indicators do you base your probability calculation?

Todd: Mainly on three factors: the rapid increase in literacy, particularly among women, a falling birthrate and a significant decline in the widespread custom of endogamy, or marriage between first cousins. This shows that the Arab societies were on a path toward cultural and mental modernization, in the course of which the individual becomes much more important as an autonomous entity.

SPIEGEL: And what is the consequence?

Todd: That this development ends with the transformation of the political system, a spreading wave of democratization and the conversion of subjects into citizens. Although this follows a global trend, it can take some time.

SPIEGEL: The impression we have at the moment is of a breathtaking acceleration of history, similar to the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989.

Todd: At this point, no one can say what the liberal movements in these countries will turn into. Revolutions often end up as something different from what their supporters proclaim at the beginning. Democracies are fragile systems that require deep historic roots. It took almost a century from the time of the French Revolution in 1789 until the democratic form of government, in the form of the Third Republic, finally took shape after France had lost a war against the Germans in 1871. In the interim, there was Napoleon, the royalist restoration and the Second Empire under Napoleon III, the "little one," as Victor Hugo said derisively.

SPIEGEL: Can the crises of transition that usually follow revolutions benefit the Islamists?

Todd: This cannot be completely ruled out when the power lies in the streets. Chaos creates the desire for a return to stability, for a sense of direction. But I don't believe that will happen. The Islamists did not play a role in Tunisia and in Egypt the course of events seems to have taken the Muslim Brotherhood by surprise. The Islamists are now trying to organize as political parties within a pluralistic system. These freedom movements are not anti-Western. On the contrary, in Libya, the rebels are calling for more support from NATO. The Arab revolution has set aside the cliché of a cultural and religious uniqueness that supposedly makes Islam incompatible with democracy and supposedly destines Muslims to be ruled by at best enlightened despots.

SPIEGEL: It's noticeable that you downplay the significance of the religious and economic factor in your interpretation. What makes you so sure?

Todd: I don't disregard it; I just think it's secondary. I am a statistician, a "cosine academic," should you find the expression amusing. The condition for any modernization is demographic modernization. It goes hand-in-hand with a decline in experienced and practiced religiosity. We are already experiencing a de-Islamization of Arab societies, a demystification of the world, as Max Weber called it, and it will inevitably continue, just as a de-Christianization occurred in Europe.

SPIEGEL: But appearances contradict your assumption. Women are not removing their headscarves, and Islamist terrorism hasn't been defeated by any stretch of the imagination.

Todd: The Islamist convulsions are classic companion elements of the disorientation that characterizes every upheaval. But according to the law of history that states that educational progress and a decline in the birth rate are indicators of growing rationalization and secularization, Islamism is a temporary defensive reaction to the shock of modernization and by no means the vanishing point of history. For the Muslim world, that vanishing point is far more universal than people are willing to admit. The notion of unchanging Islam and the Muslim essence are purely intellectual constructs of the West. The tracks along which the world's various cultures and religions move are converging toward an encounter rather than the battle that Samuel Huntington believed would take shape.

SPIEGEL: Osama bin Laden sought to conduct this clash of civilizations with spectacularly staged acts of terror. Does his death mark the political end of al-Qaida?

Todd: His ghost may continue to fascinate people. His admirers can try to keep the flame alive. But the horribly brutal action taken by the United States actually came at the worst possible moment. Al-Qaida was already politically dead before the death of Bin Laden. The organization never became a mass movement. It existed solely through the propaganda of the deed, like the European anarchists of the 19th century. Bin Laden shared with them the romantic dimension of the lone hero, the avenger of the disenfranchised.

SPIEGEL: He also called for the overthrow of Arab despots.

Todd: He failed. The popular movements of the Arab Spring have nothing in common with mythical visions like pan-Arabism or pan-Islamism. The basic fallacy consists in seeing the ideological or religious crises in the Islamic countries as phenomena of regression. On the contrary, these are crises of a modernization that destabilize the ruling regimes. The fact that the turmoil in the region and the advance of fundamentalism are coinciding is a classic phenomenon. Doubt and fanaticism are two sides of the same development. Examples can also be found in European intellectual history. Descartes, the founder of methodological doubt, gave himself the urgent task of proving the existence of God. And Pascal, a mathematician and physicist, perceived such a strong religious need that he made a bet that was as famous as it was questionable, arguing that one can lose nothing but gain everything by believing in God. He became a follower of Jansenism, a fundamentalist version of the Christianity of his day.

Unemployment and Social Frustration Foment Unrest

SPIEGEL: Aren't poverty or affluence also crucial? Tunisia, Syria, Egypt and Yemen don't have bubbling oil revenues.
Todd: Of course, one can placate the people with bread and money, but only for a while. Revolutions usually erupt during phases of cultural growth and economic downturn. For me, as a demographer, the key variable is not the per capita gross domestic product but the literacy rate. The British historian Lawrence Stone pointed out this relationship in his study of the English revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries. He saw the critical threshold at 40 to 60 percent.

SPIEGEL: Well, most young Arabs can now read and write, but how is the birth rate actually developing? The population in Arab countries is extremely young, with half of its citizens younger than 25.

Todd: Yes, but that's because the previous generation had so many children. In the meantime, however, the birth rate is falling dramatically in some cases. It has fallen by half in the Arab world in just one generation, from 7.5 children per woman in 1975 to 3.5 in 2005. The birth rate among female academics is just below 2.1, the level needed to maintain a population. Tunisia now has a birth rate similar to that of France. In Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Egypt, it has dropped below the magic threshold of three children per woman. This means that young adults constitute the majority of the population and, unlike their fathers and mothers, they can read and write, and they also practice contraception. But they suffer from unemployment and social frustration. It isn't surprising that unrest was inevitable in this part of world.

SPIEGEL: Is that why angry young men are taking the revolution into the streets, while there is a lack of recognized older forward-looking thinkers and leaders?

Todd: That isn't surprising. Young men led the revolutions in England and France. Robespierre was only 31 in 1789, and he was 36 when he was sent to the guillotine. His adversary Danton and his ally Saint-Just were also young men, one in his early 30s and the other in his mid-20s. Although Lenin was older, the Bolshevik shock troops were made up of young men, as were the Nazi storm troopers. It was young men who faced off against the Soviet tanks in Budapest in 1956. The explanation is banal: Young men have more strength and more to gain.

SPIEGEL: Why has it taken so long for the values of the modern age to reach the Islamic world? After all, the golden age of Arab civilization ended in the 13th century.

Todd: There is a simple explanation, which has the benefit of also being applicable to northern India and China, that is, to three completely differently religious communities: Islam, Hinduism and Confucianism. It has to do with the structure of the traditional family in these regions, with its debasement and with the disenfranchisement of women. And in Mesopotamia, for example, it extends well into the pre-Islamic world. Mohammed, the founder of Islam, granted women far more rights than they have had in most Arab societies to this day.

SPIEGEL: Does that mean that the Arabs conformed to older local circumstances and spread them across the entire Middle East?

Todd: Yes. The patrilinear, patrilocal system, in which only male succession is considered valid and newlyweds, preferably cousins in the ideal Arab marriage, live under the roof and authority of the father, inhibits all social progress. The disenfranchisement of women deprives them of the ability to raise their children in a progressive, dynamic fashion. Society calcifies and, in a sense, falls asleep. The powers of the individual cannot develop. The bourgeois achievement of marriage for love, and the free choice of one's partner, replaced the hierarchies of honor in Europe in the 19th century and reinforced the desire for freedom.

SPIEGEL: Is female emancipation the prerequisite for modernization in the Arab world?

Todd: It's in full swing. The headscarf debate is missing the point. The number of marriages between cousins is dropping just as spectacularly as the birth rate, thereby blasting away a barrier. The free individual or active citizen can enter the public arena. When more than 90 percent of young people can read and write and have a modicum of education, no traditional authoritarian regime will last for long. Have you noticed how many women are marching along in the protests? Even in Yemen, the most backward country in the Arab world, thousands of women were among the protesters.

SPIEGEL: The family is the private sphere par excellence. Why do changes in its structure necessarily spread to the political sphere?

Todd: The relationship between those at the top and those at the bottom is changing. When the authority of fathers begins to falter, political power generally collapses, as well. This is because the system of the patrilinear, endogamous extended family has been reproduced within the leadership of nations. The family patriarch as head of state places his sons and other male relatives in positions of power. Political dynasties develop, as in the case of the senior and junior Assad in Syria. Corruption flourishes because the clan runs things for its own benefit. The state is of course privatized as a family business. The power of obedience is based on a combination of loyalty, repression and political economics.

Arab Spring More Like "European Spring of 1848" than Collapse of Communism

SPIEGEL: The statistics reveal considerable differences. Tunisia can't be compared with Yemen. How is it that the spark of revolution still managed to jump to Yemen?
Todd: There is also an example of that in European history.

SPIEGEL: You mean the revolutions of 1848-49?

Todd: Yes. The Arab Spring resembles the European Spring of 1848 more closely than the fall of 1989, when communism collapsed. The initial spark in France triggered unrest in Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Austria, Italy, Spain and Romania -- a classic chain reaction, despite major regional differences.

SPIEGEL: If the Arab world now enters the modern age, will the universal Western values -- such as freedom, equality, human rights and human dignity -- triumph once and for all?

Todd: I would be cautious in that regard. Democratic movements can take on highly different forms, as we can see with the example of Eastern Europe after 1990. (Russian Prime Minister Vladimir) Putin undoubtedly has the support of the majority of the Russian people, but does that make Russia a flawless democracy?

SPIEGEL: Where do you draw the boundary of the West?

Todd: In fact, only Great Britain, France and the United States, in that historic order, constitute the core of the West. But not Germany.

SPIEGEL: Are you serious?

Todd: Oh, it's fun to provoke a representative of "the German news magazine." What I'm saying is that Germany contributed nothing to the liberal democratic movement in Europe.

SPIEGEL: What about the Hambach Festival in 1832, the March Revolution in 1848, the national assembly in St. Paul's Church in Frankfurt, the 1918 November Revolution, the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, (former Chancellor Konrad) Adenauer's integration with the West and the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 brought about peacefully by the people?

Todd: Okay, the postwar history is all very well and good, but it had to be put into motion by the Western Allies. Everything that happened earlier failed. Authoritarian government systems consistently prevailed, while democratic conditions had already predominated in England, America and France for a long time. Germany produced the two worst totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century. Even the greatest philosophers, like Kant and Hegel, were, unlike David Hume in England or Voltaire in France, not exactly beacons of political liberalism. No, Germany's immense contribution to European cultural history is something completely different.

SPIEGEL: And now you're going to say something nice?

Todd: The Reformation -- and, with it, the strengthening of the individual, supported by his knowledge -- and the spread of reading through the printing press -- that's the German contribution. The fight over the Reformation was waged in a journalistic manner, with pamphlets and flyers. The spread of literacy among the masses was invented in Germany. Prussia, and even the small Catholic states, had a higher literacy rate than France early on. Literacy came to France from the east, that is, from Germany. Germany was a nation of education and a constitutional state long before it became a democracy. But Martin Luther also proved that religious reforms did not by any means require the support of a spirit of liberalism.

SPIEGEL: But Germany's Sonderweg, or "special path," has now come to an end.

Todd: Well, I believe that the Germans still feel a secret and, at the same time, slightly narcissistic fear, as if they sensed that they are not quite part of the West. It seems to me that their preferred form of government is the grand coalition, not the abrupt change of power that occurs in France and the Anglo-Saxon countries. Perhaps Germany would rather be like a large Switzerland or a large Sweden, a consensus democracy in which the ideological camps come to resemble one another and the political extended family in the government takes care of everything.

SPIEGEL: What's wrong with that?

Todd: Nothing. The cultural difference between Germany and France shouldn't be buried under avowals of friendship. France is individualistic and egalitarian, at least far more so than Germany, where the tradition of the unequal, authoritarian tribal family still has an impact today, as in the debate over the right maternal image. Perhaps this also explains why Germany, despite its catastrophic birth rate, has so much trouble with immigration, and yet vastly outpaces France with its technical and industrial capabilities.

SPIEGEL: Does that mean that the German-French friendship is merely an illusion?

Todd: No, but the relationship is certainly shaped by an unspoken rivalry. However, if the European Union recognizes its diversity, even its anthropological differences, instead of trying to force everyone into the same mold with the false incantation of a shared European civilization, then Europe will also be able to treat the pluralism of cultures in the world in a reasonable and enlightened way. I'm not sure that the United States can do that.


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ABOUT EMMANUEL TODD

Myr Muratet
Emmanuel Todd, 60, studied political science in Paris and history in Cambridge. He has coducted research at the National Institute of Demographic Studies in Paris since 1984. Todd sees himself as an "empirical Hegelian" who recognizes a universal course of history. For Todd, family structures, population and educational policy factors are more important than the economic system. He has published many respected studies, such as "The Final Fall: An Essay on the Decomposition of the Soviet Sphere" (1976), "The Fate of Immigrants" (1994)," "The Economic Illusion" (1998), "After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order"(2002) and "A Convergence of Civilizations: The Transformation of Muslim Societies Around the World" (2007), about the changes in the Islamic world. An English translation of the book was published this month.

9 de mayo de 2011

China's Growing Interests in Siberia

By Matthias Schepp
Photo Gallery: A Chinese Eye on Siberia
Photos
Justin Jin/ DER SPIEGEL
There are just 6 million Russians left on the Siberian side of the border with China. Ninety million Chinese, backed by a voracious economy, live on the other side. China's influence in Russia's far east is growing rapidly and Siberia has become the raw material supplier to Beijing's economic miracle.

One needs a lot of time and patience to reach the remote Russian settlement of Mirnaya. It takes almost four days to cover the 5,000 kilometers (3,100 miles) from Moscow to Lake Baikal in Siberia. Another 1,000 kilometers brings one to the regional capital of Chita, an old Cossack center. Mirnaya is still another 300 kilometers by car to the southeast, in the direction of China.

The name Mirnaya means "The Peaceful One." But these days there is little evidence of peace and security in Mirnaya. Stray dogs roam the streets among collapsed houses. The long winters have torn holes the size of sinks into the asphalt. And apathy is reflected in the eyes of the town's few remaining residents.

Mirnaya was once a thriving garrison town with a movie theater, a kindergarten and a park. The Soviet army maintained a base here to keep an eye on neighboring China. Then the Soviet Union collapsed and the military left. To survive, those who stayed behind gradually dismantled and sold off what was left, piece by piece. First they removed the windows from the prefabricated buildings where the officers had once lived and sold them in Chita. Then they ripped radiators and pipes from the walls and sold them to scrap dealers, who then sold the metal in China. The buildings now stand like skeletons in the steppes, evidence of a ruined country.

"My brother Vadim died in one of those buildings when he was 32," says Irina, "and so did six others." Vadim eked out a living by breaking stones from the ruins, selling them for one ruble, or 2.5 cents, apiece. The last stone was one stone too many. When Vadim removed it, the ceiling collapsed.

Tea, Vodka and Beer

Irina, who is from the neighboring village of Besrezhnaya, works as a waitress in the Café Mariya, which is just past Mirnaya on the road to China. Her customers spend much of their time drowning their sorrows in tea, vodka and beer.

Her friend Galina penned a letter to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at the beginning of the year. "I'm not asking you this for myself," she wrote in her appeal to the president. "I would like you to pay more attention to our region. We have no doctors, no pharmacy and no work. There is nothing here!" Her village has a population of 713. Last year, 27 people died but not a single child was born. "If nothing happens here, we will have to go to China as guest workers," says Galina. "Or slave away in our country as coolies for the Chinese."

China is at the center of many conversations in Mirnaya. But shouldn't the Kremlin be deeply concerned over what is happening beyond Lake Baikal? The border between the fallen superpower Russia and the People's Republic, which is gradually becoming a superpower, measures 3,645 kilometers, one of the longest borders in the world. And perhaps this border, where Europe's last offshoots encounter 1.3 billion Chinese, and where Christianity collides with Buddhism and Confucianism, is also one of the most important in the power struggles of the new century.

Could an alliance develop in this region between two powerful countries that would finally put an end to American dominance of the world? One of the two has the raw materials that the other one needs so urgently. Or will the land of Vladimir Putin become a bulwark against an increasingly self-confident China, and thus become the natural partner of the West? Or will neither of these scenarios come to pass, when overpopulated China simply swallows up depopulated Siberia?

A look at Mirnaya suggests that the third scenario could very well come to pass. Now that the planned economy no longer exists, few Russians are moving to an area where the temperatures remain below freezing for more than half of the year. They lack the incentives to do so, now that the government no longer pays fringe benefits and offers generous vacation entitlement to those willing to settle in the region.

Forgotten by the Kremlin

Siberia, which covers three-quarters of the landmass of Russia, is home to only a quarter of the country's population: 38 million people. This is the equivalent of the population of Poland, except that Siberia is 40 times the size. It is a situation that many fear could once again spark the eternal rivalry between Russia and China, a rivalry that last produced military clashes in the 1960s.

Chinese investors have already bought a former tank factory in Chita, where they are now producing trucks. They already control the markets in Russian border towns, where they are the richest private business owners. "China invests more in the Russian Far East than our own government does," writes the Moscow newspaper Niezawisimaja Gazieta.

The people in Mirnaya also complain that the Kremlin has forgotten them. The poet Maxim Gorky described the region, where Moscow's former rulers frequently exiled opponents, as nothing but a "land of chains and ice." Beginning in the 16th century, Cossacks and settlers began to claim the land on behalf of the czars in the biggest land grab in history. In those days, the fur trade was the region's biggest attraction, while today oil and gas are its main draw. Russia's wealth lies in the ground beneath Siberia -- and is frittered away in glittering Moscow.

But the Moscow elite is only too aware of its failures in the region -- and the gradual expansion of the Chinese generates fear in the corridors of the Kremlin.

New Balance of Power

Years ago Dmitry Rogozin, Russia's eloquent NATO ambassador, said half-jokingly that the Chinese would soon be "crossing the border in small groups of five million." And Vladimir Putin, shortly after being elected president, warned: "Unless we make a serious effort, the Russians in the border regions will have to speak Chinese, Japanese and Korean in a few decades." This hardly seems an exaggeration, given that there are six million Russians living in Eastern Siberia, compared with the 90 million living in China's northern provinces.

The new balance of power is particularly conspicuous at the Zabaikalsk-Manzhouli border crossing, an hour's drive from Mirnaya.

Russian tourists heading to China to buy inexpensive goods are forced to wait up to 12 hours in their cars. These people, who work for distributors and are popularly known as "silk worms" or "camels," travel to China several times a month to bring goods to Russia: jeans and blouses, electric shavers and children's toys, athletic shoes made by a low-wage manufacturer called "Adidos" and chainsaws labeled "Stihl." They are pirated products, and are manufactured in southern China.

Mariya Sergeyeva, a retiree who once worked for the customs service, is traveling on one of the buses that shuttle back and forth between Zabaikalsk and the Chinese city of Manzhouli every hour. She wants to have her hair teased and buy underwear for her grandchildren. "After the border opened 20 years ago, my mother brought the Chinese used plates, knives, forks and curtains," she recalls. "And preserved meat."

Russian Raw Materials for Chinese Growth

At the time, undocumented Chinese workers flooded into Russia because the Russians were paying higher wages. The Chinese marveled at the standard of living of their neighbors, who owned TV sets and hairdryers and those large white boxes that were as cold inside in the summer as it was outside in the winter. Many of the migrant workers were from the poor villages of northern China and had never seen a refrigerator.
Sergeyeva's bus comes to a stop in no-man's-land. The Chinese customs building, a massive archway made of granite, steel and glass, lies ahead of the travelers. The much smaller structure behind them is the Russian customs building.

The contrast between the two buildings reflects the new pecking order. Sixty years ago, Moscow was still the biggest provider of foreign aid to the People's Republic. Now China is not only investing billions in Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which lie in Russia's backyard, it is also making inroads in the Belarus of Alexander Lukashenko.

Beijing, mindful of keeping up appearances, emphasizes the fraternal cooperation between the two countries. But in Chinese, the term brother is a strictly hierarchical concept. There is a word for an older brother, "gege," who must accept a subordinate role to a younger brother, or "didi." The days when Beijing was willing to play second fiddle are long gone.

The Russian imperial double-headed eagle is resplendent on top of the aging Russian customs building, gazing proudly to both the East and the West. But Russia's national coat of arms is also a manifestation of an eternal state of indecision.

Fear of Being Co-opted

The world's biggest country doesn't quite know whether it wants to be part of Asia or Europe, or whether it wants to develop a Western-style democracy or install an authoritarian form of state capitalism. "Russia's death will come in either of two ways - from the East by the sword of the awakened Chinese, or through the voluntary merger with a pan-European republican federation," the writer and philosopher Konstantin Leontyev wrote in 1891.

The fear of being co-opted still encourages the Kremlin's ideologues today to dream of their country occupying a special position between East and West. They cling to the illusion that Russia could become its own center of power in a multipolar global order, next to the United States, China, India and the European Union. But the country is now far too weak for that.

For this reason, forward thinkers like government foreign-policy advisor Sergey Karaganov advocate an alliance with the EU. "If Russia does not join forces with Europe, it will inevitably become a raw material-supplying appendage of Greater China," he writes. But the closer Russia and Europe get, the less attracted they are to one another. Russia considers Europe to be too liberal. In fact China, which, like Moscow, sees stability as the most important value and deals harshly with dissenters, thinks similarly to Russia's rulers.

This explains why the Chinese Communist Party is behaving like a bride who is still forced to woo her groom, investing billions in its northern border region. Russians arriving in Manzhouli are greeted by reminders of their homeland: a Russian Orthodox church, an oversized matryoshka and busts of the Russian national poets Alexander Pushkin and Fyodor Dostoyevsky.

When the border was opened in the early 1990s, fewer than 10,000 people lived in Zabaikalsk and Manzhouli combined. Today Zabaikalsk has remained a village with many wooden houses, even though the booming border trade has increased its size to 11,000 residents. A statue of Lenin still stands in front of the dilapidated regional administration building, and the meadows are littered with garbage that no one bothers to clean up.

China's Voracious Economy

The tallest buildings in Zabaikalsk are five-story concrete structures with squalid stairwells. But the interiors of the apartments attest to a relatively high standard of living. At the equivalent of $15,800 (€10,600), the annual GDP per capita in Russia is more than twice as high as it is in China.

In Manzhouli, where the population has climbed to 300,000 since 1990, the apartments are modest but the buildings are brightly lit by colorful neon signs. In the center of town, 30-story hotels jut into the sky, and at night the city and its skyline look a little like Shanghai. "Even the Chinese can build Potemkin villages," says a metal worker who travels to Manzhouli from Lake Baikal every month to go shopping.

In fact, things do look much more mundane during the day, when Manzhouli feels more like a hastily assembled façade designed to mask the poverty of the hinterlands -- and its real purpose, which is to serve as a transshipment point for natural resources bound for China's voracious economy.

On the eastern edge of the city, wood-processing factories are lined up next to each other for seven kilometers. Red Chinese flags fly from the tops of seemingly endless stacks of formerly Russian logs, as if the new owners were trying to emphasize that these treasures are now the property of the People's Republic. China imports two-thirds of its wood from Russia, and 700,000 rail cars carry lumber across the Russian-Chinese border each year.

But the Chinese aren't just interested in Russian lumber. They also want Russian oil. Some 1,300 kilometers farther to the east, past empty steppes where a driver is likely to encounter no more than three cars an hour, is the small city of Skovorodino. It is the terminal point of the most expensive infrastructure project in the new Russia, a "pipeline with geopolitical significance," as Prime Minister Putin raves.

Helping the Region

Putin sees the 2,757-kilometer, $12-billion oil pipeline as a warning to the West that Russia can easily sell its natural resources to Asia. Moscow built the pipeline with Chinese money and workers.

At Skovorodino, some 15 million tons of oil are loaded onto rail cars and then transferred to ships at the Pacific port of Kozmino. Another 15 million tons flow directly to China through pipelines. At the border, Chinese and Russian engineers calmly measure the quantity and quality of the oil.

Nina, a laboratory technician, was once a schoolteacher in a nearby village, before retraining. Sergey Koleznikov, the young manager of the pumping station, is pleased that "the pipeline is not just helping Russia in its recovery, but also the people here in the region." The only minor complaint is to be heard from Chinese worker Jia Yanping, 24, who says: "Spending three months at a time away from home is a little long."

But there are also limits to the Russian-Chinese partnership, and they become evident after another night journey with the Trans-Siberian Railroad: 760 kilometers away in the Russian city of Blagoveshchensk and in Heihe on the Chinese side of the Amur River.

The cities use the same slogan in their advertising at trade shows: Two Countries, One City. In reality, however, the neighbors have remained strangers. It irks many Russians in Blagoveshchensk that Chinese entrepreneur He Wenan has built five shopping centers in their city, runs the most expensive hotel and drives the first Bentley ever seen there, or that businesswoman Li Lihua has brought the city's traditional brewery, and that a Chinese woman is now producing Kvass, a popular Russian beverage made from bread.

Repopulating the Hinterlands

But there are also examples of harmony between the two countries, like Natasha, a Russian woman, and her Chinese husband Shi Xiaoyun.
It is evening on the Amur River. The two are sitting at home, cuddling with their one-year-old son. Because Shi, who has taken the name Sergey to simplify things, still hasn't grown fond of traditional Russian dishes like borsht and blinis, Natasha has learned how to make Chinese food. They are a happy and successful family.

Natasha works as a pharmaceutical representative, while Shi runs a successful acupuncture practice. He sits with Russian friends in the Russian sauna known as the Banya, and does everything possible to be more Russian than the Russians, and yet he has remained an outsider. Sometimes people shout at him when he crosses the street, berating him as a "Chinese pig."

On the other side of the river, at the morning market in Heihe, the neighbors are also skeptical of each other. On Wenhua Lu, the Street of Culture, representatives of the two nations haggle fiercely over such products as T-shirts selling for the equivalent of €2 apiece, fake Hennessy cognac for just over €4 per bottle and flashlights that hardly last beyond the first use.

It's as if haggling over money had brought out the worst sides of both nations. The Russian customers, not particularly affluent themselves, treat the Chinese like their inferiors. They in turn exact their revenge on the "long-noses" by trying to cheat them at every opportunity.

Symbolic Policies

Russian complaints about the poor-quality Chinese goods are trite. Neither of the two sides can offer anything resembling sophisticated technology. Indeed, the market in Heihe is merely a reflection of the nature of business between Beijing and Moscow in general, with cheap goods being traded for oil and gas. This solidifies Russia's dependence on the trade in natural resources.

In its frontier city of Blagoveshchensk, the Kremlin tries to hide this calamity behind purely symbolic policies. It has built a grand riverfront promenade lined with high-rise buildings intended to overshadow Heihe. The old triumphal arch, torn down by the communists, a memorial to the journey of the soon-to-be Czar Nikolai to the Amur region in 1891, has been rebuilt. It bears the inscription: "The earth along the Amur was, is and will always be Russian."

To ensure that this remains the case, the central government in Moscow and the local governor have launched a program to entice people from the now-independent former Soviet republics to move to Russia's depopulated border regions. The plan is even working, at least here and there. Ironically, the saviors of Russian Siberia could be non-Russians, those from "nearby foreign countries."

Patvakan Akobajan, for example, heard the call. The 33-year-old Armenian resettled with his wife, mother-in-law and three children in Ushakovo, a village 200 kilometers from Blagoveshchensk, where he now lives in a sparkling clean house. He says: "I wake up every morning and can hardly believe our good fortune." The Russian authorities paid for the family's move, and gave them land, 14 calves, 2 cows and €10,000 in starting capital.

A Church and a Bell Tower

A calendar from Putin's party, United Russia, hangs in the kitchen next to the cake pans. The chairman of the district association praises the immigrants for their entrepreneurial spirit. Patvakan plans to open a small bakery soon and encourage relatives and friends to move to the area, as well.

Svetlana and her husband Igor moved to Ushakovo from Kazakhstan. After railing against the aging Kazakh autocrat Nursultan Nazarbayev, Svetlana praises Putin and Medvedev for being "young and full of energy," and insists that Russia looks forward to a great future. The couple is happy that Ushakovo will soon be connected to the natural gas and mobile phone network.

Svetlana already has an idea for how she can show her gratitude to Russia. "We have to build an Orthodox church with a tall bell tower," she says, "so that the Chinese over there can hear that there are still people here."

Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan